Kenya’s Refugee Crisis: From Encampment to Integration?

Introduction 

Kenya has long been central to refugee affairs in Africa, hosting two of the world’s largest refugee camps — Kakuma and Dadaab — established in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Kakuma, located in northwest Kenya, hosts an estimated 201,000 refugees, primarily from Sudan and Somalia. Dadaab, located southeast of Kakuma and divided into three smaller camps (Hagadera, Dagahaley, and Ifo), collectively supports an estimated 240,000 refugees and asylum seekers. These refugees and asylum seekers have been displaced, either due to the civil war in 1991 or the 2011 drought and famine in Somalia.  What were initially meant to be temporary settlements have evolved into long-term communities.

Despite their permanence, these camps remain sites of exclusion, where refugees face severe restriction on movement, employment, and access to essential services. In response, the Kenyan government introduced the Shirika Plan — Socioeconomic Hubs for Integrated Refugee Inclusion in Kenya. First implemented in April 2023, it is a policy shift aimed at integrating refugees into local communities in hopes of fostering self-reliance. However, recent events have exposed the fragility of this vision. Severe food shortages, compounded by cuts in international aid, have led to growing unrest, with protests in Kakuma met by violent police crackdowns. These developments raise pressing questions: Is Kenya truly moving toward refugee integration, or does the Shirika Plan intend to uphold long-standing policies of encampment?

A brief history of Kenya’s refugee policy 

Kenya has not always adopted a restrictive, containment-based approach to refugee policy. In the post-independence period, motivated by a shared anti-colonial spirit and a commitment to Pan-Africanism, Kenya initially favored refugee integration. During the 1980s, this approach primarily supported those fleeing civil wars in Uganda and Ethiopia. It focused on economic integration: granting refugees entry permits, freedom of movement and the right to work. At that time, it was understood that refugees brought valuable skills that could contribute to the economy. With relatively low numbers — ranging from 5,000 to 20,000 — the government was able to offer support and employment opportunities with fewer restrictions.

However, the Somali Civil War in 1991 caused a significant shift. Under the rhetoric of security and safety concerns, Kenya adopted more restrictive asylum policies, including rejection at the border, the containment of refugees in camps, and even their expulsion back to the war-torn regions from which they fled. The government went as far as to block humanitarian aid, preventing relief agencies from assisting Somali refugees after their forced return. They justified this harsh response by emphasising the overwhelming number of refugees entering Kenya, as the refugee population grew by 430,000 between 1991 and 1993. A similar approach is now seen in many Western countries, where force, brutality, and seclusion have taken precedence over integration.

Kenya has ultimately established its refugee camps primarily in areas of underdevelopment and shifted its responsibility for refugee affairs, delegating management to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Over the years, the Kenyan government has attempted to close these camps multiple times: in 1992, 2016, 2019, and 2021. Despite threats, the government collaborated with the UNHCR to introduce the Refugee Act in November 2021. This act outlines plans to transform these camps into integrated settlements. 

The Shirika Plan

The Shirika Plan, standing for Socioeconomic Hubs for Integrated Refugee Inclusion in Kenya, is designed as the implementation framework for the Refugee Act of 2021. Under this Act, refugees in Kenya are granted the freedom to move within designated areas, the right to work, and the right to own property. They are also integrated into national systems, with refugee children gaining access to free primary education. The goal of this plan is to achieve the socioeconomic inclusion of refugees within their host communities by transforming the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps into integrated settlements. Here, refugees would live alongside local communities, contribute to local economies, and have access to government services. Eventually, refugee communities should become self-sufficient enough to no longer depend on aid. 

The Shirika Plan theoretically offers a more humane solution to the refugee crisis. However, its introduction in such a short time frame warrants caution. Sudden changes in refugee management can lead to unintended consequences, including strained relations between refugees and host communities as well as challenges in implementing such a substantial transformation. This is especially the case  given Kenya’s history of encampment, and such shortcoming is reflected in the turbulence of today’s current climate.

The current climate

Earlier this month, protests erupted in Kakuma Refugee Camp in response to severe aid cuts, mainly affecting food and water supplies. The protests were sparked by the widespread shortage of food, a direct result of the World Food Programme (WFP)’s insufficient funding which had led to a 60% reduction in food aid. The cuts came in the wake of a U.S. aid freeze and a general reduction of international support, leaving refugees in a dire situation. Refugee Andrew Dafir described how rations were reduced from 4 kg to just 2 kg of cereal per person, while essential items like cooking oils and beans were eliminated altogether. Cash aid was also increased slightly from 650 to 820 Kenyan shillings. However, this did not substantially alleviate suffering. 

Tensions had been rising for months. Refugee residents noted reductions in water supplies and cuts to cash support payments, alongside the requirement for refugees to pay for their children’s school fees. As a result, initially peaceful protests turned violent after police crackdown. The Kenyan government imposed a curfew from 6 PM to 7 AM in an attempt to control the situation, further intensifying security protocols.

Although UNHCR officials dismissed the protests as disruptive to essential services like water supply and food distribution, the protests highlight deeper issues within the camp. Many refugees felt ignored by the authorities, with some claiming that their pleas for help went unheard. In the words of one refugee, Rita Namembe: “We are suffering in Kakuma.” The government’s heavy-handed response, compounded by the spread of misinformation, has only worsened the crisis. This exposes the fragile state of refugee management and highlights the urgent need for more sustainable humanitarian solutions.

Whilst the Shirika Plan calls for greater integration, such displays of intolerance towards refugee protests reveal the long road the Kenyan government must embark upon to free itself from its institutionalised encampment approach. Furthermore, despite the Shirika Plan being heavily dependent on foreign aid to sustain its implementation, such examples of foreign aid withdrawal reveal why there is necessity for the implementation of a plan that teaches refugee communities to become self-sufficient through economic integration. International aid is often unpredictable and inconsistent, subject to political shifts and donor priorities. Self-sufficiency ensures that refugees can survive and thrive even when funding decreases. Rather than allowing recent events to further divide the Kakuma camp from its host community, there is a powerful potential for Kenya to distance itself from its dependency on global powers and use this to solidify the need for integration.